Development of the Paranormal and Supernatural Beliefs Scale using classical and modern test theory by Dean, Charlotte E et al.




and Supernatural Beliefs Scale using classical 
and modern test theory
Charlotte E. Dean*, Shazia Akhtar, Tim M. Gale, Karen Irvine, Richard Wiseman and Keith R. Laws 
Abstract 
Background: This study describes the construction and validation of a new scale for measuring belief in paranormal 
phenomena. The work aims to address psychometric and conceptual shortcomings associated with existing meas-
ures of paranormal belief. The study also compares the use of classic test theory and modern test theory as methods 
for scale development.
Method: We combined novel items and amended items taken from existing scales, to produce an initial corpus of 29 
items. Two hundred and thirty-one adult participants rated their level of agreement with each item using a seven-
point Likert scale.
Results: Classical test theory methods (including exploratory factor analysis and principal components analysis) 
reduced the scale to 14 items and one overarching factor: Supernatural Beliefs. The factor demonstrated high internal 
reliability, with an excellent test–retest reliability for the total scale. Modern test theory methods (Rasch analysis using 
a rating scale model) reduced the scale to 13 items with a four-point response format. The Rasch scale was found to 
be most effective at differentiating between individuals with moderate-high levels of paranormal beliefs, and dif-
ferential item functioning analysis indicated that the Rasch scale represents a valid measure of belief in paranormal 
phenomena.
Conclusions: The scale developed using modern test theory is identified as the final scale as this model allowed for 
in-depth analyses and refinement of the scale that was not possible using classical test theory. Results support the 
psychometric reliability of this new scale for assessing belief in paranormal phenomena, particularly when differentiat-
ing between individuals with higher levels of belief.
Keywords: Paranormal beliefs, Anomalous beliefs, Supernatural, Scale, Scale development, Factor analysis, Rasch 
analysis, Rating scale model, Classical test theory, Modern test theory
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Background
Research suggests that belief in the paranormal correlates 
with a range of psychological constructs, including anxi-
ety, locus of control, suggestion, imagery, fantasy prone-
ness, critical thinking, religiosity and creativity [1–7]. 
Belief in the paranormal has also been shown to correlate 
with cognitive factors such as cognitive ability, thinking 
style and executive function [8–11]. Similarly, associa-
tions have been seen between academic discipline and 
paranormal beliefs, particularly when comparing hard 
science and medical students to those from the arts and 
humanities [8, 12, 13], although some ambiguity sur-
rounds these findings [2, 14]. Finally, some evidence indi-
cates that demographic characteristics such as age and 
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gender also influence belief in the paranormal, although 
the extent of these effects have been questioned [15–18]. 
While much of this work indicates a negative influence 
of paranormal beliefs on cognition and psychological 
well-being, many studies have also demonstrated posi-
tive and adaptive functions of such beliefs. These adap-
tive functions include goal setting, emotional clarity, 
clarity about the self and the wider world, coping with 
trauma and stress, and the reduction of fear surround-
ing ambiguous stimuli [19–26]. Similarly, paranormal 
experiences have been shown to have adaptive outcomes, 
particularly in the wake of a bereavement [27–30]. These 
positive experiences may in turn lead to belief in the 
paranormal. Indeed, several studies have reported posi-
tive correlations between paranormal experience and 
belief [31–33]. This may also relate to the relationship 
between emotion-based reasoning and an individual’s 
proneness to paranormal attributions [34, 35]. Regard-
less of the cause of these beliefs, the breadth of work in 
this area suggests that belief in the paranormal should 
not be automatically viewed as a negative or problem-
atic trait. However, some researchers argue that there is 
a specific type of believer whose beliefs are more likely to 
be associated with negative biases and dysfunctions. Pre-
vious work has suggested that paranormal believers can 
be divided into two subgroups: informed believers (who 
have a deeper understanding of paranormal phenomena 
and their putative causes), and quasi-believers (whose 
beliefs represent a superficial understanding of para-
normal phenomena) [36, 37]. It has been proposed that 
negative associations seen between paranormal beliefs 
and cognition are a function of a tendency to hold quasi-
beliefs, and that informed believers represent a small 
subgroup of believers whose beliefs are independent of 
any cognitive deficits [36, 37]. However, it is still unclear 
whether paranormal believers can be reliably divided into 
such subgroups [38].
Despite this large amount of work, researchers have yet 
to agree on a definition of the term “paranormal”. While a 
review of existing definitions is beyond the scope of this 
paper, the present work adopts the widely held view that 
phenomena can be considered paranormal when they 
violate the basic limiting principles of current scientific 
understanding [39], and so includes phenomena such as 
telepathy, life after death, astrology, and hauntings.
However, widespread agreement exists that research in 
this area is hampered both by studies employing a diverse 
range of measures of paranormal belief [4, 40–44], and by 
the lack of psychometric validity for some scales [45–48]. 
Much of the discussion has focussed on the three most 
frequently used scales—namely, the Paranormal Belief 
Scale [49], the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale [50] and the 
Survey of Scientifically Unaccepted Beliefs [51].
Paranormal Belief Scale
The Paranormal Belief scale in both original [49] and 
revised format (RPBS) [52] is the most widely used meas-
ure of paranormal belief. The revised format contains 
26 items, adopts a broad definition of paranormal phe-
nomena, and contains seven subscales (Traditional Reli-
gious Belief, Psi, Witchcraft, Superstition, Spiritualism, 
Extraordinary Life Forms, and Precognition). Several 
issues have been raised regarding both the item content 
and the factor structure of the RPBS [47, 48, 53–61]. 
Much of this criticism has centred on the Extraordinary 
Life Forms (ELF) and Traditional Religious Belief (TRB) 
subscales.
The ELF subscale consists of several cryptozoological 
items, including those relating to the alleged existence of 
the Loch Ness monster and the abominable snowman of 
Tibet. Some have argued that endorsing the existence of 
such alleged extraordinary life forms is not strongly asso-
ciated with belief in more ‘mainstream’ paranormal phe-
nomena, such as telepathy and premonitions [47]. These 
cryptozoological items have also been shown to be prob-
lematic in samples with greater cultural diversity, leading 
some researchers to replace items with more culturally 
relevant equivalents [62–65]. The ELF subscale also has 
the lowest internal reliability of the seven RPBS subscales 
and has frequently failed to reach recommended Cron-
bach’s alpha thresholds [53, 66–69].
The TRB subscale has raised concerns due to contra-
dictory evidence concerning the relationship between 
paranormal and religious beliefs. While several studies 
have noted positive correlations between religiosity and 
belief in the paranormal [9, 70, 71], others have found 
those displaying especially strong forms of religious belief 
to be less likely to endorse the existence of paranormal 
phenomena [72, 73]. Some suggest that the relationship 
may be best conceptualised as curvilinear, with paranor-
mal belief increasing alongside religious beliefs, but then 
decreasing when religious beliefs become particularly 
strong [74, 75].
A further criticism of the RPBS has focused on the 
fact that only one item in the scale is negatively worded. 
This could clearly increase the risk of RPBS scores being 
affected by respondents endorsing this item without fully 
considering its content [76].
Australian Sheep‑Goat Scale
The Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS) [50] consists 
of 18 items and contains three subscales (Belief in Extra-
sensory Perception, Psychokinesis, and Life After Death). 
The original response format for the ASGS involved a vis-
ual analogue scale, with respondents indicating their level 
of agreement with each item by marking a horizontal 
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line. Scoring involved using a ruler to yield a value from 
1 to 44, and these scores were then recoded to give a 
final value of 0, 1 or 2 for each item. Subsequent versions 
employed a force-choice format, with participants select-
ing one of three response options (‘True’, ‘Uncertain’, and 
‘False’) that are then recoded as 2, 1 or 0. The visual ana-
logue scale and forced choice options produce similar 
overall scores [77]. The ASGS has also been adapted for 
use with a six-point Likert scale, with some authors argu-
ing that this format is less confusing for respondents and 
easier to interpret than the original visual analogue [78].
Although the ASGS tends to yield moderate-to-large 
intercorrelations between the three subscales, the Life 
After Death subscale exhibits the lowest internal reliabil-
ity, leading some to suggest that it may undermine over-
all scale integrity [45]. Also, although the visual analogue 
ASGS presented both negatively and positively worded 
items, the more frequently employed force-choice and 
Likert formats lack any negatively phrased items. As 
such, they raise concerns about response bias.
Despite the issues raised with the ASGS and its differ-
ences to the RPBS, several studies have noted positive 
correlations of 0.70 and above between the two scales 
[79, 80].
Survey of scientifically unaccepted beliefs
The Survey of Scientifically Unaccepted Beliefs (SSUB, 
also referred to as the “Survey of Popular Beliefs”) [51] is 
a more recent alternative for measuring belief in the par-
anormal. The SSUB is made up of 20 items and contains 
two subscales: New Age Beliefs and Traditional Religious 
Beliefs. The scale has high levels of internal reliability [51, 
81, 82], has a balance of positive and negative items, and 
has not seen the same level of scrutiny and critique as the 
ASGS or RPBS. Although many of the phenomena fea-
tured in the scale could be considered paranormal (e.g., 
the existence of genuine haunted houses, psychics and 
fortune tellers), the inventory also contains items relat-
ing to several scientifically unaccepted beliefs that are not 
commonly associated with the paranormal (e.g., the lack 
of a rational explanation of crop circles and pixies, which 
are based upon mystery and elusiveness rather than a 
strict violation of scientific principles).
Differential item functioning
In addition to the criticisms outlined above, some 
researchers have questioned whether variations in 
responses on the existing scales may be partly a func-
tion of semantic biases introduced by age or gender, 
rather than fluctuations in level of belief [56]. This issue 
is commonly referred to as differential item function-
ing (DIF). Rasch scaling (a modern test theory model) 
has been applied to the ASGS [83] as a way of detecting 
these biases and assessing their effect. Findings indicated 
weak age and gender biases for some ASGS items, but the 
effect of these biases was minimal and suggests that the 
scale is not significantly affected by DIF. The same scaling 
has also been applied to the RPBS [56], with significant 
DIF for gender seen on 18 items, and age on 15 items. 
Consequently, using top-down purification (combining 
factor analysis and Rasch scaling), a two-factor model 
was suggested to reduce the impact of DIF, which has 
subsequently been employed in several studies [22, 33, 
34, 84–86]. Despite the extensive use of the purified scale, 
several items of the RPBS failed to load on either of the 
two new factors, with the authors highlighting that addi-
tion of new items to the RPBS may produce additional 
belief clusters to those identified through their analyses 
[56]. DIF analysis was also used in the construction of 
the SSUB to remove three items from the original item 
pool that were identified for age and gender biases [51]. 
As such, these items do not feature on the final version of 
the SSUB.
Classical test theory and modern test theory
Latent traits such as paranormal beliefs are, by defini-
tion, unobservable. Therefore, research relies on the use 
of self-report scales, like those mentioned above, which 
assume that individuals’ responses to items are influ-
enced by the latent trait of interest [87]. Classical test the-
ory (CTT) and modern test theory (MTT; also referred 
to as item response theory) are the two primary methods 
used in psychological scale development. Both CTT and 
MTT models strive to measure and improve the reliabil-
ity, validity, and internal consistency of the scale under 
assessment [88, 89] but do so in different ways. One of 
the key differences between these approaches is that 
CTT assumes that measurement precision is equal for all 
individuals, while MTT takes the view that measurement 
precision depends on individuals’ levels of the latent trait 
[90].
CTT models, focused at the test-score level, assume a 
linear model that links the observable test score (X) to 
the sum of two unobservable variables: true score (T) 
and error score (E) [91]. This assumption can be more 
clearly illustrated with the following formula: X = T + E. 
In this formula, the observed score (X) represents the 
observed total score calculated from the scale in use, 
and the error score represents a random, non-systematic 
error assumed to be independent of the true score (e.g., 
poorly functioning test items, or external confounding 
variables). The true score is often conceptualised as the 
mean of all scores obtained if an individual responded to 
the given scale an infinite number of times [92]. There-
fore, the observed score of X can be considered to be a 
combination of both relevant information relating to the 
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latent variable of interest and the error associated with 
each item [93]. A factor-analytic strategy (often relying 
on the use of exploratory factor analysis for item selec-
tion) is among the most popular CTT method for scale 
development, and has the primary aim of developing an 
internally consistent scale with a manageable number of 
differentiable dimensions [94].
CTT models offer certain advantages. For example, 
many CTT models are based on relatively weak assump-
tions, and are therefore easily met with real test data [91]. 
These models are also simple to use and allow for exami-
nation at the test-score level of the precision with which 
the latent trait of interest is measured by a given scale 
[95]. However, CTT’s standing popularity, despite the 
emergence of more modern approaches to scale develop-
ment, could be attributed to the fact that many research-
ers are familiar with its basic concepts and are likely to 
have encountered CTT (or to have used scales that were 
developed through CTT methods) [93]. Therefore, it is 
important to also consider the limitations of CTT. The 
central limitation of CTT models is that person and item 
parameters are sample-dependent, which limits the util-
ity of these statistics in scale development [89, 91]. CTT 
models also do not allow for rigorous assessment of 
item characteristics that can be computed under differ-
ent models, and so scales developed using CTT methods 
may suffer from differential item functioning (as men-
tioned above) [93].
In contrast to CTT models, MTT models are nonlinear 
and focus at the item level, seeking to relate respondents’ 
performance on individual test items to their estimated 
level of the latent trait of interest [96]. These models are 
assumed to be invariant across populations, meaning the 
item and test parameters can be interpreted independent 
of specific samples. The type of MTT model used in scale 
development may differ depending on the type of data 
collected (dichotomous data such as yes/no responses, or 
polytomous data collected using Likert response meth-
ods), and on the number of dimensions they specify. In 
general, MTT models can be said to have three main 
goals: (1) to produce items that provide the most infor-
mation about respondents’ levels of the latent trait of 
interest, (2) to present respondents with items tailored 
to their latent trait levels, and (3) to reduce the number 
of items needed to determine respondents’ level of the 
latent trait without loss of reliability [96]. The advantages 
of MTT models over CTT models are most notable at 
the item level. Item characteristics, differential function-
ing and fit to the model can be assessed, as well as indi-
viduals’ response styles and the functionality of response 
scales [97]. However, a limitation of MTT models is their 
use of sophisticated and in-depth statistical analyses 
which remain unfamiliar to many researchers and testing 
professionals [96]. The assumptions of MTT models are 
also more restrictive compared to those of CTT models 
(i.e., more difficult to meet with real test data), and sam-
ple size requirements are much larger for both items and 
respondents [97]. For unidimensional MTT models (such 
as the Rasch model), minimum sample sizes of approxi-
mately 200 respondents are required [98]. However, 
multidimensional MTT models require large sample 
sizes ≥ 1000 respondents to identify precise item param-
eters and decrease error estimation [99].
CTT and MTT models both have their individual 
strengths relating to scale development and assessment. 
Therefore, complete and successful psychometric assess-
ment may benefit from the use of both models, which 
would provide information about individual item func-
tioning as well as how items function as a unit [97].
Present study
Paranormal belief scales suffer from various shortcom-
ings, including sub-scales that are often heavily culture 
specific or do not reflect mainstream beliefs commonly 
associated with the paranormal, a lack of negatively 
phrased items and the potential for differential item 
functioning. The present study sought to address these 
issues by creating a scale that included phenomena that 
are widely considered to be associated with the paranor-
mal, had less culture-bound items, combined both posi-
tively and negatively phrased items, and did not contain 
evidence of differential item functioning. The first aim of 
this study was to construct a scale for measuring para-
normal beliefs, examine the latent structure and refine 
the scale using both CTT and MTT models. The second 
aim was to assess the test–retest reliability of the new 
scale(s). Finally, the study aimed to compare the scales 
developed through CTT and MTT methods to deter-
mine the usefulness of each approach, and to determine 




We recruited an opportunistic sample of the general pub-
lic (N = 343) through advertisements placed on social 
media. These advertisements asked for participants 
over the age of 18 and fluent in English to complete sev-
eral short questions about their beliefs in paranormal 
and superstitious phenomena, as well as a few short 
questions about themselves. Removal of incomplete 
responses resulted in the final sample (N = 231: 83 males 
and 144 females, 4 unreported: Age 18–80, M = 36.94, 
SD = 14.60). Most participants were white (51.10% 
white British, 21.20% other white background, 06.90% 
White Irish) and held an undergraduate degree or higher 
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(71.00%). Of the participants with a university education, 
most had a background in psychology (21.60%).
Materials
An initial collection of 29 statements regarding paranor-
mal and superstitious phenomena was generated using 
adapted items from: the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale 
(RPBS) [52], the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS) 
[50], and the Survey of Scientifically Unaccepted beliefs 
(SSUB) [51], as well as four novel items developed by the 
authors. These novel items arose from discussion and 
examination of the RPBS, ASGS and SSUB to identify any 
phenomena absent from these measures, such as posses-
sions and protection objects. Examples of the phenom-
ena used include luck (lucky charms and bad luck), psi 
(sixth sense and psychics) and hauntings (Ouija boards 
and possession). The scale contained both positively 
(n = 23) and negatively phrased items (n = 6).
Procedure
The scale was administered as an online survey using 
Qualtrics Survey Software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT; see 
https:// www. qualt rics. com). Participants were informed 
that the study was concerned with paranormal and super-
stitious belief within the general population. Respondents 
who agreed to take part were asked to provide their age, 
gender (male, female, other), ethnicity (Arabic, Asian/
Asian British, Bangladeshi, Black/Black British, Chinese, 
Indian, Pakistani, White British, White Irish, other Asian 
background, other White background, mixed back-
ground) level of education (doctoral degree, postgraduate 
degree, undergraduate degree, post-secondary educa-
tion, secondary education, vocational) and academic dis-
cipline if they had indicated a university education 
(architecture, arts and humanities, business, education, 
law, medicine, natural sciences, philosophy, psychol-
ogy, social sciences, theology, technology, other medical, 
other). Respondents had the option not to provide the 
above demographic details. Participants then completed 
the paranormal scale. Responses were recorded using a 
7-point Likert scale (Strongly Disagree, Moderately Disa-
gree, Slightly Disagree, Uncertain, Slightly Agree, Moder-
ately Agree, Strongly Agree). The seven response options 
were numerically coded from 1 to 7 for positively worded 
items, and reverse coded for the negatively worded items. 
Following completion of the scale, we asked participants 
if they would be willing to complete the scale again one-
week from the date of initial completion.
Informed consent was obtained from all participants 
and all methods were performed in accordance with rel-
evant guidelines and regulations. Ethical approval for 
the study was granted by the University of Hertfordshire 
Health, Science, Engineering and Technology Ethics 
Committee with Delegated Authority (HSET ECDA).
Data analysis
Analyses will be conducted using two models: a classi-
cal test theory (CTT) model and a modern test theory 
(MTT) model. Therefore, the analysis will use both an 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and a rating scale model 
(Rasch model). The EFA will allow for the identification 
of underlying latent constructs underpinning the scale. In 
other words, EFA will be used to identify emerging sub-
categories (or factors) across the initial collection of 29 
items. Factors emerging through EFA will be interpreted 
as distinct categories of paranormal belief. EFA will be 
conducted using a principal components extraction 
method, selecting only eigenvalues greater than 1, and a 
direct oblimin rotation. Items with factor loadings < 0.50 
will be removed from the scale and the EFA run again 
until all items have acceptable factor loadings. EFA will 
also explore group differences and answering patterns to 
the scale items and factors to further assess the effective-
ness of the remaining scale items.
Rasch analysis will be conducted to allow for a com-
parison between CTT and MTT methods of scale devel-
opment. Owing to the polytomous nature of the data, a 
rating scale model (RSM) [100] will be adopted for the 
Rasch analysis. Analyses will first evaluate item thresh-
olds and item characteristic curves (ICCs) for the ini-
tial collection of 29 items to assess the suitability of the 
7-point Likert response format. Item fit to the model 
will then be assessed by examining both infit (weighted) 
and outfit (unweighted) mean square statistics (MNSQ). 
Items identified for overfitting (MNSQ < 0.07/t < -2) 
or underfitting/misfitting (MNSQ > 1.2/t > 2) will be 
removed from the scale [101]. The person-item map will 
then be consulted to assess item difficulty, and to deter-
mine whether the remaining items meaningfully measure 
the ability (level of belief ) of all persons. Therefore, we 
will be using the person-item map to determine whether 
the final scale is suitable for measuring the range of para-
normal belief (from low belief/scepticism to high belief ). 
A CTT method of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
will be used alongside the Rasch analysis to confirm the 
unidimensional model fit of the RSM. Finally, remaining 
items will be tested for DIF in relation to: age, gender, 
ethnicity, education, or discipline.
A test–retest reliability analysis will be conducted for 
both the CTT and MTT scales.
Results: classical test theory
Factor structure of the scale
An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted 
to investigate the latent constructs underpinning the 
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scale. A principal components extraction method was 
employed and only eigenvalues greater than one were 
extracted. A direct oblimin rotation was used to account 
for the non-orthogonality of the items. Bartlett’s Test of 
Sphericity was significant (χ2 = 4975.77, p < 0.001) and the 
Kaiser–Mayer–Olkin value equalled 0.95 indicating that 
the data were suitable for further analysis. A four-factor 
solution was extracted, accounting for 64.32% of the 
total variance. Cronbach’s Alpha was computed for each 
factor, with all four showing good internal consistency 
(α > 0.70). Examination of the pattern matrix revealed 
seven items with low item loadings (< 0.50), and so a sec-
ond analysis was undertaken after excluding these items. 
The second analysis conducted on 22 items indicated a 
three-factor solution, accounting for 63.94% of the total 
variance. Inspection of the pattern matrix revealed a fur-
ther two items with loadings < 0.50, leading to an analy-
sis restricted to 20 of the scale items. The final analysis 
accounted for 65.67% of the total variance. All emergent 
factors demonstrated good levels of internal consistency 
and were conceptually distinct. Of the nine items that 
were removed during EFA, most were concerned with 
belief in psychics and those with supernatural abilities 
(e.g., “psychokinesis, the movement of objects through 
psychic powers, does exist”, “tarot cards are an accurate 
way to see a person’s past, present, and future”, “astrology 
is a way to accurately predict the future”, “mind reading is 
possible”).
The first factor, eigenvalue 10.07, accounted for 50.34% 
of the variance and demonstrated excellent internal reli-
ability (α = 0.95). The 14 items contained within Factor 1 
concerned phenomena such as spell casting, communi-
cating with the dead, hauntings, possession, the soul, and 
premonitions. As this factor contained 70% of the total 
scale items and covered a variety of paranormal phenom-
ena that could be considered supernatural, Factor 1 was 
subsequently labelled “Supernatural Beliefs”. The sec-
ond factor had an eigenvalue of 1.87 and accounted for 
9.34% of the variance. Factor 2 showed excellent internal 
reliability (α = 0.88). The factor comprised three items 
concerned with common superstitions centred around 
bad luck. Factor 2 was subsequently labelled “Bad Luck”. 
The final factor, eigenvalue 1.20, accounted for 5.99% 
of the variance, with low to moderate internal reliabil-
ity (α = 0.53). Factor 3 comprised three items regarding 
telepathy, charms, and predicting the future, and was 
labelled “Psi”.
Response differences between believers and sceptics
We divided participants into groups of ‘believers’ and 
‘sceptics’ according to their mean scores (with those 
scoring below the overall mean of 67.30 identified 
as ‘sceptics’ and those above as ‘believers’). The total 
sample comprised 117 (50.60%) sceptics and 114 (49.40%) 
believers.
Principal component analysis
To provide a visual overview of answering patterns for 
the two groups, a principal component analysis (PCA) 
was conducted using the ggfortifiy [102] package in R 
version 4.0.2 [103]. The PCA score plot (see Fig. 1) shows 
responses to all 20 items as a function of respondent 
group, and highlights the distinct clustering of believ-
ers and sceptics, with very little overlap between the two 
groups. To visually represent the responses to each item 
on the scale for believers and sceptics, a raincloud plot 
was created, and the results can be seen in Fig. 2.
Group answering patterns
Responses for believers and sceptics were tested for each 
item and factor. Table  1 displays the percentage agree-
ment for each item and subsequent factor across both 
groups. Responses labelled “strongly disagree”, “moder-
ately disagree” and “slightly disagree” were collapsed to 
give an overall “disagree” score for a given item or fac-
tor. The same was done for responses labelled “strongly 
agree”, “moderately agree” and “slightly agree” to pro-
vide an overall “agree” score. Participants’ percentage of 
“uncertain” responses are also shown here as a function 
of respondent group. Percentage agreement was also cal-
culated for participants in the upper and lower quartiles 
to provide a more accurate reflection of item-based dif-
ferences for the most sceptical participants and those 
with the strongest paranormal beliefs (see Table 2).
Fig. 1 PCA score plot of all responses to the paranormal scale as a 
function of respondent group. Figure plots participants’ responses to 
the scale items against the two principal components that represent 
the largest variability among the two groups, to provide a visual 
indication of separation (or lack thereof ) between the groups
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To test for differences in the two groups, items were 
then stacked by factor and Chi-Square analysis was con-
ducted. Believers and sceptics differed reliably on all 
factors, with believers scoring significantly higher than 
sceptics (i.e., agreeing with more of the statements) for 
each of the three factors (see Table 3).
Examination of the group answering patterns 
revealed that, while most believers agreed overall with 
Factors 1 and 3, a higher proportion disagreed with 
Factor 2. Therefore, it can be said that the items in Fac-
tor 2 are less effective in separating believers and scep-
tics, particularly when compared to the percentage 
scores for Factor 1. Inspection of Table 3 revealed that 
the scores for believers and sceptics were most similar 
for Factor 2, with Factors 2 and 3 both displaying small 
effect sizes. As Factors 2 and 3 both presented limita-
tions (both had small effect sizes, Factor 2 was less 
effective in separating the two groups, and Factor 3’s 
internal reliability was below satisfactory thresholds), a 
final exploratory factor analysis was conducted remov-
ing the six items contained within Factors 2 and 3. The 
analysis used the same extraction and rotation methods 
as before. Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant 
Fig. 2 Raincloud plot of mean scale scores given as a function of 
respondent group. Figure presents mean Likert scores (from 1 to 7) 
for all items on the scale, with individual mean scores per participant 
shown for each group, and a histogram showing the distribution of 
mean scale scores for each group
Table 1 Percentage agreement with factors and items as a function of respondent group
*Reverse scored items, table presents the percentage of believers and sceptics who indicated agreement, disagreement, or uncertainty for each item and each factor
Disagree % Uncertain % Agree %
Believers Sceptics Believers Sceptics Believers Sceptics
Factor 1 Total 13 75 19 12 67 13
Item 1 4 60 16 13 80 27
Item 3 8 55 18 22 74 23
Item 5 31 90 25 5 45 5
Item 7 14 71 22 20 64 9
Item 8 11 87 16 5 73 8
Item 9 13 82 9 13 78 5
Item 10 3 64 11 15 87 21
Item 12 8 72 28 17 64 11
Item 13 22 91 11 5 67 4
Item 15* 9 61 24 18 68 21
Item 16 13 68 10 7 77 26
Item 17* 13 80 31 11 56 9
Item 18 20 86 25 6 54 8
Item 20 18 91 26 7 56 3
Factor 2 Total 64 94 12 2 23 4
Item 2 61 92 15 3 25 5
Item 4 60 95 11 3 30 3
Item 6 73 95 11 1 16 4
Factor 3 Total 30 69 20 6 49 25
Item 11* 46 85 14 1 39 15
Item 14* 23 57 24 10 54 32
Item 19* 21 64 24 8 55 28
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(χ2 = 2565.14, p < 0.001) and the Kaiser–Mayer–Olkin 
value equalled 0.95 indicating that the data were suit-
able for further analysis. A one-factor solution was 
extracted, accounting for 62.93% of the total variance. 
Cronbach’s Alpha was computed for this factor, which 
retained the excellent internal consistency found in the 
earlier analysis (α = 0.95). Table 4 presents the final 14 
items contained within the single factor alongside the 
component loadings seen in the (non-rotated) compo-
nent matrix.
Demographic differences
Owing to the somewhat mixed research suggesting a cor-
relation between paranormal beliefs, academic discipline 
and aspects of thinking, responses to the paranormal 
scale were compared for those with and without higher 
education backgrounds; and between those from sci-
ence and non-science academic disciplines. Most partici-
pants held an undergraduate degree or higher (n = 164), 
while less than half held post-secondary qualifications or 
lower (n = 67). Participants with university degrees had 
lower total paranormal scores (M = 46.20, SD = 22.89) 
than participants without university degrees (M = 61.34, 
SD = 22.08). The difference in scores between the two 
education groups was significant [t(126.78) = −4.68, 
p < 0.001]. Of the participants with degree qualifications, 
most were from science-based disciplines including psy-
chology, natural sciences, technology, and other medical 
backgrounds (n = 83), while the rest included social sci-
ences, education, business, philosophy, theology, art and 
humanities, law, and architecture (n = 57). As 24 par-
ticipants did not disclose their discipline, the following 
Table 2 Percentage agreement with factors and items for upper and lower quartiles
*Reverse scored items, table presents the percentage of participants in the upper and lower quartiles who indicated agreement, disagreement, or uncertainty for each 
item and each factor
Disagree % Uncertain % Agree %
Upper quartile Lower quartile Upper quartile Lower quartile Upper quartile Lower 
quartile
Factor 1 Total 6 91 11 4 83 4
Item 1 3 82 3 5 93 13
Item 3 2 84 7 8 91 8
Item 5 12 98 19 0 69 2
Item 7 7 85 16 11 78 3
Item 8 2 98 3 2 95 0
Item 9 3 98 0 2 97 0
Item 10 0 92 3 3 97 5
Item 12 2 94 21 6 78 0
Item 13 12 98 12 0 76 2
Item 15* 3 76 19 13 78 11
Item 16 7 82 3 5 90 13
Item 17* 9 94 16 2 76 5
Item 18 10 97 16 2 74 2
Item 20 5 100 17 0 78 0
Factor 2 Total 55 99 15 0 30 1
Item 2 55 98 17 0 28 2
Item 4 45 100 10 0 45 0
Item 6 64 100 17 0 19 0
Factor 3 Total 19 74 23 5 58 22
Item 11* 28 82 17 2 55 16
Item 14* 12 69 24 8 64 23
Item 19* 17 69 28 5 55 26
Table 3 Mean score (standard errors), χ2, p values, and Cramer’s 
V for likelihood ratio tests for groups within each factor
Factor Mean (SE)
Believers Sceptics χ2 p Cramer’s V
1 5.07 (.10) 2.19 (.11) 1330.63  < .001 .45
2 2.82 (.12) 1.41 (.07) 93.24  < .001 .26
3 4.32 (.11) 2.64 (.14) 105.83  < .001 .28
Page 9 of 20Dean et al. BMC Psychol            (2021) 9:98  
analyses were conducted on 140 participants. Those from 
science-based disciplines demonstrated lower paranor-
mal scores (M = 40.02, SD = 21.28) compared to those 
with art-based degrees (M = 54.77, SD = 22.24), and the 
difference in scores between the two discipline groups 
was significant [t(116.99) = 3.92, p < 0.001].
Test–retest reliability
Sample and procedure
A follow-up study was conducted to assess the test–retest 
reliability of the newly developed scale. Of the original 
sample of 231 participants, 37 (16% of the original sam-
ple) agreed to complete the scale a second time, one-
week after their initial participation. The retest sample 
consisted of 21 males (56.80%) and 16 females (43.20%), 
aged between 18 and 73 (M = 41.51, SD = 16.61). In con-
trast to the original sample, this sample had a higher 
percentage of male participants and a higher mean age. 
The difference in gender between the original participant 
group and the retest group was significant (χ2 = 5.433, 
p = 0.020). However, the difference in age between 
the two groups was not significant [t(262) = −1.77, 
p = 0.078].
Nineteen respondents were identified as ‘sceptics’ 
(51.35%) and 18 as ‘believers’ (48.65%), according to 
their mean scores on the 14-item scale at time one (with 
those scoring below the overall mean of 50.59 identified 
as ‘sceptics’ and those above as ‘believers’). The question-
naire completed by participants comprised the original 
collection of 29 statements and used the same 7-point 
Likert response format (Strongly Disagree, Moderately 
Disagree, Slightly Disagree, Uncertain, Slightly Agree, 
Moderately Agree, Strongly Agree). Responses were 
numerically coded as before. The scale was administered 
again as an online survey using Qualtrics Survey Soft-
ware (Qualtrics, Provo, UT; see https:// www. qualt rics. 
com).
Retest analysis
Retest analyses were conducted on the final 14-item 
scale. Pearson’s correlations revealed a strong test–retest 
reliability for the scale [r(35) = 0.98, p < 0.001], as well as 
for both believers [r(15) = 0.88, p < 0.001] and sceptics 
[r(18) = 0.90, p < 0.001]. A scatterplot of the scores for 
believers and sceptics at time one and time two can be 
found in Fig. 3.
Results: modern test theory
The MTT analyses presented in the following sections 
were conducted using a Rasch rating scale model (RSM) 
using the eRm [104, 105] package in R version 4.0.2 [103].
Response categories
MTT analyses first focused on evaluating the effective-
ness of the 7-point Likert rating scale. As it is difficult to 
be certain of the exact way the sample will use the rat-
ing scale, investigation is necessary to verify or improve 
the functioning of the rating scale categories [106]. To 
evaluate the response category use of the sample, thresh-
old parameters of each category were examined for each 
of the original 29 items. These thresholds identify and 
define the boundaries between each response category 
and should therefore increase monotonically. Conse-
quently, participants with higher levels of paranormal 
beliefs should be more likely to endorse higher response 
Table 4 Single-factor scale with corresponding Cronbach’s Alpha (α) score and component loadings
*Reverse scored items
Factor α Items (loading scores)
1 Supernatural Beliefs .95 1 The soul continues to exist after a person has died (.76)
2 Your mind or soul can leave your body (.77)
3 It is possible to cast spells on persons using formulas and incantations (.80)
4 It is possible to be reincarnated (.74)
5 Some people with psychic abilities can accurately see the future (.86)
6 It is possible to communicate with the dead (.86)
7 Buildings can be haunted by spirits or other supernatural entities (.87)
8 Some psychics have helped find the bodies of murder victims through paranormal means (.85)
9 A person’s star sign can have a direct influence on their personality (.76)
10* Reports of an apparent sixth sense are generally based on fantasies (.72)
11 Having a dream that comes true is not just a coincidence (.71)
12* Communicating with spirits or other supernatural entities through a Ouija board is not possible (.75)
13 It is possible to become possessed by an evil supernatural entity (.81)
14 It is possible to protect one’s home from spirits using protection objects and herbs (.83)
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categories. For the Rasch analyses, responses are shifted 
such that the lowest category (strongly disagree) is 0.
Analysis of the 7-point rating scale revealed that 
threshold parameters failed to increase monotonically, 
therefore indicating evidence of step disordering. Step 
disordering, occurring when threshold parameters fail to 
increase monotonically, indicates that certain response 
categories have a low probability of being observed 
[106], meaning that the sample are less likely to use 
these response categories. The lack of ordered increase 
occurred at Category 2 (somewhat disagree). Examina-
tion of the item category curves (ICCs) indicated that 
Category 2 had the lowest probability of observance and 
was therefore never more likely to be observed than any 
other category. Put more simply, regardless of an individ-
ual’s level of belief in paranormal phenomena, the prob-
ability of choosing “somewhat disagree” is never the most 
likely. Similarly, Category 1 (moderately disagree) also 
had a low probability of observance and at no point was 
this category most likely to be observed.
To begin to improve the functioning of response cat-
egories, responses were recoded such that the “moder-
ately disagree” and “somewhat disagree” categories were 
collapsed, as were the “moderately agree” and “somewhat 
agree” categories. This gave a revised 5-point scoring 
method (0 = strongly disagree, 1 = disagree, 2 = uncer-
tain, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree). However, this revised 
scoring method failed to rectify step disordering. Exami-
nation of the ICCs revealed that the boundaries between 
Categories 1 and 2 (disagree and uncertain) were very 
narrow and suggested that the sample did not clearly dif-
ferentiate between these two categories. Therefore, a final 
recoding took place such that the “disagree” and “uncer-
tain” categories were collapsed, giving a final revised 
4-point scoring method (0 = strongly disagree, 1 = disa-
gree, 2 = agree, 3 = strongly agree). When this final 
scoring method was used, the four categories increased 
monotonically, with the desired appearance of the range 
of peaks for each category appearing in the ICCs for each 
item. An example of the ICC for item 1 is shown in Fig. 4.
Item fit
Mean square statistics (MNSQ) were computed to deter-
mine item fit to the model (i.e., how well each item con-
tributes to defining a single unidimensional construct). 
The MNSQ statistics indicate the amount of distortion 
of the scale, where high MNSQ values indicate unpre-
dictability and a lack of construct similarity with other 
scale items (underfitting), and low values indicate item 
redundancy and less variation in the observed data com-
pared to the variation that was modelled (overfitting) 
[107]. Two MNSQ statistics were used to assess item fit: 
infit (weighted) and outfit (unweighted) statistics. Sub-
sequent analyses used an accepted range of fit of 0.7 to 
1.2 [101] to identify items with poor model fit. Therefore, 
items with MNSQ values < 0.7 were identified as overfit-
ting the model, and MNSQ values > 1.2 were identified 
as underfitting the model. When assessing item fit to 
the model, infit and outfit t-statistics were also exam-
ined where t-values < -2 were identified as overfitting 
and t-values > 2 were identified as underfitting. However, 
it has been suggested that infit and outfit MNSQ values 
are relatively insensitive to sample size variation in poly-
tomous data, while the t-statistics vary considerably with 
sample size. Therefore, it has been recommended that 
infit and outfit t-statistics are interpreted with caution 
when determining item fit to the model for large sam-
ples and polytomous data [101]. As such, items would 
be removed from the scale if they demonstrated both 
infit and outfit MNSQ values that were overfitting or 
underfitting the model. In cases where items were only 
identified on one of the MNSQ values (infit or outfit), 
t-statistics were consulted to verify item misfit. Based on 
the MNSQ values of the 29 items, a total of 7 items (4, 
10, 12, 13, 15, 28 and 29) were identified for overfitting 
and a further 8 items (1, 2, 5, 8, 14, 17, 23 and 27) were 
identified for underfitting. Subsequently, these 15 items 
were removed from the scale and the analysis was con-
ducted again on the remaining 14 items. A final item (7) 
was identified for overfitting the model and was removed 
from the scale. Analysis of the final 13 items revealed infit 
and outfit statistics within the specified ranges. While 
item 11 produced an infit t-statistic of − 2.2, the infit 
and outfit MNSQ values were within the specified range 
(0.81 and 0.83, respectively) as was the outfit t-statistic 
(− 1.76). Considering these other statistics and given that 
the infit t-statistic of item 11 was very close to -2, it was 
Fig. 3 Test–retest reliability analysis as a function of respondent 
group. Pearson’s correlations between participants’ individual total 
scores at time one and time two shown for each group
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determined that the item demonstrated reasonable fit to 
the model and that there was not sufficient evidence to 
remove the item from the final scale. Table 5 shows the 
final MNSQ statistics for the remaining items, along with 
the corresponding item difficulty statistics.
Owing to the substantial change in the number of scale 
items, thresholds for the 4-point response scale were 
consulted to verify the functioning of the new rating scale 
for the remaining 13 items. The analysis demonstrated 
that the thresholds of the four categories increased 
monotonically for all remaining items. An example of the 
ICC for item 3 is shown in Fig. 5, which again shows the 
desired range of peaks.
Item difficulty
The final RSM analysis conducted using the and eRm 
package [104, 105] sought to estimate the person trait 
and item difficulty parameters. In other words, the fol-
lowing analysis aimed to determine whether the difficulty 
of the remaining items was appropriate for the sample. 
Fig. 4 Item characteristic curve for item 1 using the 4-point scoring method. Curves represent the probability of selecting a category along the 
latent trait. Category 0 = “strongly disagree”, Category 1 = “disagree”, Category 2 = “agree”, Category 3 = “strongly agree”
Table 5 Parameter values for the remaining 13 items (in order of item difficulty)
Item Outfit MSQ Infit MSQ Difficulty
6 If you break a mirror, you will have bad luck 1.002 1.112 2.547
18 Fairies and similar beings are real 1.001 0.866 2.432
19* Fortune tellers’ predictions are typically based on guesswork 1.046 0.823 2.026
16 A person’s star sign can have a direct influence on their personality 0.971 0.993 1.663
21 Some health conditions can be treated with psychic healing 0.986 0.937 1.587
26 It is possible to become possessed by an evil supernatural entity 1.018 0.991 1.540
25* Communicating with spirits or other supernatural entities through a Ouija board is not 
possible
1.199 1.170 1.475
11 Mind reading is possible 0.832 0.809 1.401
9 It is possible to be reincarnated 1.049 0.974 1.318
22 In some cultures, shamans or “witch doctors” exercise powers we cannot explain 0.892 0.862 1.199
20* Reports of an apparent sixth sense are generally based on fantasies 0.829 0.833 0.829
3 Your mind or soul can leave your body 1.074 1.058 0.793
24 Having a dream that comes true is not just a coincidence 0.832 0.837 0.766
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To meaningfully measure the ability (level of paranor-
mal belief ) of all persons, items should be located along 
the length of the latent dimension. The person-item map 
shown in Fig.  6 displays both the person traits (in the 
upper panel) and item difficulties (lower panel) along the 
same latent dimension. As shown, the category thresh-
olds of most of the 13 items cover a low-to-high range 
of paranormal belief well. However, item difficulty loca-
tions (identified in Fig. 6 as solid circles) cluster towards 
the right side of the latent dimension. Therefore, the 
items have a higher probability of differentiating between 
individuals with higher levels of paranormal beliefs. For 
example, item 6 (“if you break a mirror, you will have bad 
luck”) shows the highest item difficulty meaning that 
participants with higher levels of paranormal beliefs are 
more likely to agree with this item.
Differential item functioning
Differential item functioning (DIF) analysis was con-
ducted using rating scale trees within the psychotree 
[108, 109] package in R version 4.0.2 [103]. Before this 
analysis was conducted, data for 8 participants who 
chose not to disclose demographic information were 
removed. Data was also removed for participants scoring 
only in either the highest or lowest categories (i.e., par-
ticipants responding “strongly disagree” to all 13 items, 
or “strongly agree” to all items”) as these responses do 
not provide information relating to item difficulty and 
therefore do not contribute to the Rasch model. Conse-
quently, data for 14 participants (all of whom scored in 
the lowest categories) were removed. In total, 22 partici-
pants were removed and the DIF analysis was conducted 
on a reduced sample of 209 participants. If none of the 
scale items show evidence of DIF, then the analysis should 
produce a tree with only a single node, supporting a uni-
dimensional Rasch model for the data [110]. However, if 
the Rasch tree shows at least one split and identifies more 
than a single node containing the entire sample, then DIF 
is present. An advantage of using the Rasch tree method 
for identifying DIF is that DIF can be detected between 
groups of participants created by more than one covari-
ate (e.g., females under 34), and these groups do not need 
to be pre-specified prior to analysis. As such, the Rasch 
tree method searches for the value corresponding to the 
strongest parameter change and splits the sample at the 
value identified [110]. The DIF analysis was conducted 
for five covariates: age, gender, ethnicity, education, and 
discipline. Analysis produced a tree with a single node, 
and therefore no DIF was present in the scale for any of 
the covariates. The single-node tree can be seen in Fig. 7.
Confirmatory factor analysis
As a final test of the unidimensionality of the scale, 
a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted 
using the lavaan [111] package in R version 4.0.2 [103]. 
To determine the strength of model fit, four main fit 
Fig. 5 Item characteristic curve for item 3 in the reduced scale using the 4-point scoring method. Curves represent the probability of selecting a 
category along the latent trait. Category 0 = “strongly disagree”, Category 1 = “disagree”, Category 2 = “agree”, Category 3 = “strongly agree”
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indices were used: comparative fit index (CFI), Tucker-
Lewis index (TLI), root mean square error of approxi-
mation (RMSEA), and standardised root mean square 
residual (SRMR). For both the CFI and TLI, a value of 
0.90 or above would indicate acceptable fit and a value 
of 0.95 or above would indicate very good model fit. 
For the RMSEA, a value of 0.05 or below would indicate 
close model fit, with a value of 0.08 indicating accept-
able fit. The accompanying p value for the RMSEA sta-
tistic should also be greater than the standardised value 
of 0.05 for close model fit. Finally, an SRMR value of 0.05 
or below would indicate a well-fitting model. Overall, the 
model demonstrated good fit, and supported the use of 
a unidimensional Rasch model for the data. Complete fit 
statistics can be seen in Table 5.
Rasch test–retest reliability
The sample for the test–retest reliability analysis was the 
same as that described in the EFA analysis. While par-
ticipants were divided into believers and sceptics based 
on their mean scores for the 13-item Rasch scale at time 
one (with those scoring below the overall mean of 26.94 
identified as ‘sceptics’ and those above as ‘believers’), 
the analysis retained the original split seen in the EFA 
analysis of 19 sceptics and 18 believers. Pearson’s correla-
tions revealed a strong test–retest reliability for the scale 
[r(35) = 0.92, p < 0.001], and for believers [r(16) = 0.75, 
p < 0.001]. However, the retest correlation was not signifi-
cant for sceptics [r(17) = 0.45, p = 0.051]. A scatterplot of 
the scores for believers and sceptics at time one and time 
two can be found in Fig. 8. Cronbach’s Alpha computed 
for this final scale, indicated an excellent internal reliabil-
ity (α = 0.91).
Correlations between scales
To compare the performance of the CTT and MTT 
derived scales, a final correlational analysis was con-
ducted comparing respondents’ total scores on each 
scale. The analysis only included respondents who 
were identified as ‘sceptics’ or ‘believers’ by both 
scales. Therefore, 17 respondents were removed from 
the analysis owing to the scales placing them in dif-
ferent groups, and the final analysis was conducted 
on a reduced sample of 214. Of the reduced sample, 
Fig. 6 Person-item map for the 13-item scale. Figure displays the location of person traits and item difficulties along the same latent dimension 
(paranormal belief ). The person traits are located on the scale from left (low belief ) to right (high belief ). Locations of item difficulties are presented 
as solid circles, and thresholds of adjacent category locations are presented as open circles. The item parameters are located on the scale from least 
difficult (left) to most difficult (right)
Page 14 of 20Dean et al. BMC Psychol            (2021) 9:98 
102 respondents were identified as ‘sceptics’ (47.66%) 
and 112 as ‘believers’ (52.34%). Pearson’s correlations 
revealed a strong correlation between the scales for 
the total sample [r(212) = 0.96, p < 0.001], as well as for 
both believers [r(110) = 0.86, p < 0.001] and sceptics 
[r(100) = 0.82, p < 0.001]. A scatterplot of the scores for 
believers and sceptics at time one and time two can be 
found in Fig. 9.
Fig. 7 Single-node Rasch tree.  Note: Figure shows differential item functioning analysis conducted on the covariates of age, gender (male or female), 
ethnicity (white background or BME background), education, and discipline. No differential item functioning was identified. Item number is represented 
on the x axis in both plots. Item difficulty is represented on the y axis of the top plot (higher values represent higher item difficulty), and item threshold 
parameters are shown on the y axis of the lower plot (with the lightest shade representing the ‘strongly agree’ response category)
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Discussion
With a view to developing a new measure of belief in 
paranormal phenomena, two methods of scale develop-
ment were compared. The first approach was based on 
the procedures of classical test theory (CTT), with a par-
ticular emphasis on exploratory factor analysis. The sec-
ond approach used modern test theory (MTT) based on 
Rasch analysis for polytomous data. The CTT method 
reduced the initial collection of 29 items to a 14-item 
scale, describing paranormal belief on a single dimen-
sion: Supernatural Beliefs. MTT analyses produced a 
final collection of 13 items measured with a reduced 
4-point scoring method. The final MTT derived scale is 
put forward as the new self-report measure of paranor-
mal and supernatural beliefs, referred to as the ‘Paranor-
mal and Supernatural Beliefs Scale’ (PSBS; see Additional 
file 1: Paranormal and Supernatural Beliefs Scale).
Several similarities can be seen between the CTT and 
MTT derived scales. First, both scales support a uni-
dimensional measure of belief in paranormal phenom-
ena. In the CTT analyses, Factor 2 (Bad Luck) initially 
demonstrated an excellent internal reliability. However, 
examination of the group answering patterns presented 
interesting findings, with over half of the believers’ 
responses to these items falling under the “disagree” cate-
gory. The high “disagree” scores seen for believers in Fac-
tor 2 suggest that bad luck may not be diagnostic of belief 
in more general paranormal phenomena, as the factor 
was less effective in separating believers and sceptics. For 
this reason, the three items contained within Factor 2 
were removed from the CTT scale. The three items con-
tained within Factor 3 (Psi) were also removed from the 
CTT scale as the factor did not meet satisfactory thresh-
olds (which may be attributed to the fact that all items 
within this factor were negatively phrased) [112–114]. 
When initial analyses indicated three distinct catego-
ries of belief, the Supernatural Beliefs factor explained 
the most variance and included 70% of the total scale 
items. This factor was retained as the only factor for the 
14-item CTT scale (α = 0.95), and encompassed many 
phenomena considered to be paranormal or supernatural 
[115, 116] suggesting that belief in the paranormal may 
be best characterised by a single overarching factor that 
is equally understood by both paranormal believers and 
sceptics. This provides further support for the removal 
of Factors 2 and 3 from the CTT scale which, while both 
having their own strengths and weaknesses, may repre-
sent categories of beliefs that are separable from paranor-
mal beliefs. Item infit and outfit mean square (MNSQ) 
statistics (as well as differential item functioning analysis) 
produced through MTT analyses also indicated that the 
data supported a unidimensional structure, providing 
further support for the idea that belief in the paranormal 
may be best represented by a single dimension. As previ-
ous work has suggested a combination of CTT and MTT 
techniques for psychometric assessment [97], confirma-
tory factor analysis and reliability analysis (Cronbach’s 
alpha) were also computed to assess the functioning 
of the MTT scale items as a complete unit. These find-
ings again supported the unidimensional structure of 
the scale and indicated an excellent internal reliability 
(α = 0.91). In addition to high internal reliabilities, both 
scales demonstrated strong test–retest reliability cor-
relations (0.98 for the CTT scale and 0.92 for the MTT 
scale). However, examination of the retest statistics for 
each group (believers and sceptics) revealed differences 
Fig. 8 Test–retest reliability analysis for the Rasch scale as a function 
of respondent group. Pearson’s correlations between participants’ 
individual total scores at time one and time two shown for each 
group
Fig. 9 Correlations between respondents’ individual total scores. 
Pearson’s correlations between respondents’ total scores on the 
classical test theory and modern test theory scales, as a function of 
respondent group
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between the two scales. While the CTT and MTT scales 
both demonstrated good retest correlations for believers 
(0.88 and 0.75 respectively, ps < 0.001), the retest corre-
lation for sceptics was not significant in the MTT scale 
[r(17) = 0.45, p = 0.051] compared to the CTT scale 
[r(17) = 0.90, p < 0.001]. The difference in these scores can 
be explained using the person-item map produced dur-
ing MTT analyses, which suggested that the item within 
the MTT scale have a lower probability of differentiat-
ing between individuals with lower levels of paranormal 
beliefs. Similar differences were not able to be established 
through CTT analyses. To the authors’ knowledge this is 
the first presentation of separate retest scores for believ-
ers and sceptics. Comparison of the performance of both 
scales revealed strong correlations between respondents’ 
total scores on the CTT and MTT derived scales in the 
total sample (r = 0.96), and for believers (r = 0.86) and 
sceptics (r = 0.82) separately. A final similarity between 
the two scales can be seen in their item content, as both 
scales shared 7 common items (approximately half of the 
total scale content).
Despite the strengths of the CTT scale, and its simi-
larities to the MTT scale, the results of the study pro-
vide strong evidence to support preference of the MTT 
derived scale. First, MTT analyses allowed for inves-
tigation and refinement of the 7-point Likert scale. The 
results indicated that respondents did not require so 
many response options, and supported removal of three 
categories leading to a final 4-point scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = strongly agree). Cat-
egories 1 and 2 of the original Likert scale (moderately 
disagree and somewhat disagree), both had low prob-
abilities of observance and were subsequently collapsed 
into a single category (as were the moderately agree and 
somewhat agree categories). The “uncertain” category 
was also found to be inadequate in representing partici-
pants’ responses, with results suggesting that this cat-
egory may be poorly defined with respondents not clearly 
differentiating between this category and the “disagree” 
category. A 7-point Likert scale was initially selected 
for the scale as it was thought that the large number of 
response options would produce a more precise index of 
respondents’ level of agreement. However, these findings 
suggest that the response options provided in the origi-
nal 7-point scale did not represent differentiable levels of 
belief intensity (as is indicated by a monotonic increase of 
category thresholds). Additionally, MTT analyses permit-
ted an assessment of differential item functioning (DIF). 
Using the Rasch tree method for identifying DIF within 
the MTT scale, analysis focused on five covariates (age, 
gender, ethnicity, education, and discipline) to determine 
whether these, or some combination of these, influenced 
participants’ responses to the scale. Examination of the 
tree revealed a single node, with no DIF identified for any 
of the covariates. Therefore, while the MTT scale can be 
described as a valid measure of belief in paranormal phe-
nomena, it is difficult to be certain that the CTT derived 
scale does not suffer from DIF. As mentioned above, 
MTT analyses also allowed for examination of item dif-
ficulty, with results indicating that items had a higher 
probability of differentiating between respondents with 
moderate-high levels of paranormal beliefs. This infor-
mation is particularly useful for future research looking 
to utilise the scale to examine group differences within 
paranormal beliefs. The following comparisons focus on 
the final PSBS developed through MTT analyses.
Several important differences can be noted when com-
paring the PSBS to the three most frequently employed 
measures of paranormal belief. The unidimensional 
structure of the PSBS is far simpler than the 7-factor 
RPBS, with the content of many RPBS factors (such as 
those within Witchcraft, Spiritualism and Precognition) 
appearing in the PSBS. The appropriateness of this solu-
tion accords with previous research suggesting that a 
larger array of factors may not provide the most prudent 
account of paranormal belief [117], particularly as the 
RPBS has an insufficient number of items to adequately 
sample seven distinct dimensions of paranormal belief. 
Such criticisms may explain why a range of studies have 
failed to replicate the original factor structure of the 
RPBS, finding smaller factor structures ranging between 
one and six to be more suitable [117]. Despite this, most 
of these replication studies have suggested paranor-
mal belief to be a multidimensional construct, which 
contradicts the findings from the present work. While 
the structure of the PSBS is more comparable to that of 
the ASGS (but still differs in terms of dimensionality of 
belief ), the range of items contained within the PSBS is 
much broader as its focus is not confined to parapsycho-
logical phenomena such as extrasensory perception and 
psychokinesis, though it does include several psi-related 
items.
The item content of the PSBS also differs considerably 
from the existing scales in that the final scale presents 
three negatively phrased items, and contains few cryp-
tozoological, religious, or culturally-specific items. By 
reducing the number of potentially problematic items 
and ensuring a blend of positive and negative items, the 
PSBS reduces the risk of biases introduced by partici-
pant response patterns and cultural differences, which 
have been highlighted as issues for older measures. While 
cultural differences are often present in paranormal 
beliefs [118], and consequently some PSBS items have 
seen cultural influence, the PSBS has a reduced num-
ber of culture-bound items compared to previous scales 
such as the RPBS. Therefore, the PSBS may be a stronger 
Page 17 of 20Dean et al. BMC Psychol            (2021) 9:98  
candidate for a universal measure of paranormal belief. A 
further strength of the PSBS seen particularly when com-
pared to the RPBS, is that that the scale is not affected by 
certain subgroup characteristics, including respondents’ 
age gender, ethnicity, level of education, or academic 
discipline. DIF analysis indicated that the PSBS is a reli-
able unidimensional scale that can be used to explain 
data from all respondents. The results seen for the DIF 
analysis are worth comparing to the RPBS, which con-
tains items that are particularly sensitive to age and gen-
der differences [56], as they suggest that the items within 
the PSBS have a universal application for respondents 
regardless of the highlighted subgroups.
Finally, there are a few limitations of the present study 
which should be noted. First, many of the participants 
involved in the study were young, well-educated, white 
females. While analyses confirmed that age, gender, 
ethnic and educational differences (including academic 
discipline) do not influence item functioning, further 
research could explore the psychometric properties of 
the PSBS with more varied samples and across a diverse 
range of cultures. Furthermore, although the PSBS 
focuses on many phenomena that might have a universal 
application in practice (e.g., communication with spir-
its), it does present some specific examples that may be 
more prominent in Western cultures (e.g., Ouija boards). 
Finally, MTT analyses expressed that the scale is good at 
measuring moderate-high levels of paranormal beliefs, 
and so operates sufficiently for the purpose of identifying 
individuals with increased levels of paranormal beliefs. 
However, additional items that tap specifically into low 
levels of paranormal beliefs may be beneficial to add to 
the scale in future revisions to accurately capture the 
complete range of beliefs.
Conclusions
Both CTT and MTT derived scales supported a uni-
dimensional view of belief in paranormal phenomena. 
However, the scale developed through the MTT model 
was selected as the final measure owing to the in-depth 
statistical analyses and refinement this model provided. 
Although future revisions and further scrutiny of the 
scale across different samples is warranted, the data and 
analyses presented here support the psychometric reli-
ability of this new scale for assessing belief in paranormal 
phenomena. The PSBS displays excellent internal reliabil-
ity and retest statistics for believers and the total sample, 
and resolves many of the psychometric and conceptual 
limitations associated with existing scales. However, it is 
important to note that the scale is most effective at differ-
entiating between individuals with higher levels of belief. 
We hope that the PSBS will contribute to future empirical 
research in the field and provide a universal and reliable 
alternative to the existing measures of paranormal beliefs 
currently in use.
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